The Guardian: Bruno Fernandes Occupies Cunha's Familiar Areas, Forcing Him to Change His Game

On September 7 local time, The Guardian believes Manchester United's new-look front four have excellent individual ability but still lack sufficient chemistry and attacking fluidity. Cunha, playing as a false nine, needs to adapt to Bruno Fernandes occupying familiar areas, Mbeumo prefers to move inside, and Rashford's dribbling has not consistently created danger, leaving United with more possession but unable to truly dominate opponents.

The following is The Guardian's analysis.

“Tunnel vision” gave Mbeumo a few seconds of focus. He completely ignored the teammates in red around him, while the Everton players in blue seemed to be lining up to escort him. In a team sport, this could be considered selfish, but sometimes the most satisfying moments come from exactly this kind of “selfishness” — when the ball hit the inside of the net, Manchester United were delighted by that focus and single-mindedness.

This is Manchester United's new front four. Rashford played for Barcelona last season, but since the others had already played together for a year, they should have developed stronger understanding. Bruno Fernandes, operating as the No.10, is the initiator of attacks, while Matheus Cunha, Mbeumo and Rashford are trying to combine individual skill, tactical freedom and instinctive cooperation into a complex formula capable of disrupting defenses. At present, however, the formula is far from perfect.

For this system to work, everyone must understand their own responsibilities and those of their teammates. In a high-speed league like the Premier League, any hesitation can kill an attack before it even begins. Instinct is an important part of every attacker’s toolkit, but ironically, that instinct can only be developed through long periods of playing together on the pitch — it does not appear automatically because players have high transfer values.

Fluidity can become a highly aggressive weapon, leaving opponents confused: they must constantly consider who they should track, and any momentary lapse in concentration can allow a late runner to punish them. This is the idea behind Carrick using Cunha as a false nine, allowing the Brazilian to move freely and search for the positions he believes can cause the most damage.

At Wolves, Cunha preferred to drop deeper and operate in deeper areas. He was especially good at taking a short touch before curling shots from 20 yards (around 18 meters) into the corners of the goal. That is actually the ideal way for him to play at Manchester United, but Bruno Fernandes now occupies the areas Cunha used to favor, forcing Cunha to change his game. At the same time, United have lost a player who can consistently threaten the final line of the defense.

Mbeumo likes to move inside from the right and is not especially suited to beating full-backs from wide areas, reaching the byline and then finding teammates. By comparison, Rashford is more capable of taking on a right-back from both directions. In this match, he caused problems for emergency defender Merlin Röhl: the England forward exploded from a standing position and used his acceleration to burst past the opponent. However, such moments have not appeared often.

Although Manchester United had more possession and often pushed Everton back into their own half, Pickford was not seriously tested for long periods. Even though Bruno Fernandes played with confidence, he could not always provide the decisive spark or find teammates in better positions because they were not always where he expected them to be, and sometimes they did not understand the runs their captain wanted them to make. Passes failing to reach the intended areas happened too frequently, whether through balls into empty spaces with no one arriving or passes going straight out of play. This was certainly not a demonstration of precision.

There were moments in the second half when everything came together perfectly. Rashford delivered the ball to the far post, Mbeumo headed it back to Bruno Fernandes, and Bruno Fernandes' volley struck the crossbar — a sequence from the eighth minute that showed the relationships between United's attacking players seemed to be gradually developing. But such combinations were far too rare, and the entire front line lacked enough penetration.

Considering Mbeumo scored in the 47th minute, the goal should have provided a major confidence boost, but the expected effect did not arrive. They remained an attacking quartet relying on flashes of inspiration rather than sustained pressure and control of the match. With Cunha playing as the striker and the team lacking an attacking focal point, Everton had little to worry about for much of the game until Sesko came on.

After coming on, Sesko became the attacking focal point the team had previously lacked. His goal came from a typical Bruno Fernandes-style intelligent pass: the captain found a teammate making an overlapping run, who delivered the ball perfectly toward the 6-foot-5-inch (around 1.96-meter) Sesko, who headed home. It was a simple yet nearly perfect move, seemingly from another era but still effective today.

This attack was built on everyone understanding their responsibilities and executing them perfectly, while each player knew where the others would appear at the key moment. Bruno Fernandes could anticipate Luke Shaw moving into the space on the flank, and Shaw did not need to think about where Sesko would be waiting for his delivery.

The positive aspect of the second half was that it showed the variety within United's squad. They can change their approach during matches and see whether opponents can adapt quickly enough. When opponents become tired from dealing with one style of play, switching from speed and movement to physicality is not always easy to handle. The starters brought a complex attacking approach, while Patrick Dorgu and Sesko provided a more direct style.

Bruno Fernandes, Mbeumo, Rashford and Cunha are all top players, and their careers prove that, but outstanding individual ability does not automatically mean they can form a coordinated unit. As they spend more time playing together, the four will gradually understand each other's characteristics, and playing two matches a week will also help them establish rhythm.

If the team's attacking organization cannot improve its cohesion, Carrick has every reason to bring back the more direct and less “fashionable” Plan B.