September 9: Has the Five-Time World Champion Brazil Fallen? A Generation of Talents Chasing Wealth and a Youth System Losing Its Way May Mark the End of Samba Football's Golden Era

Why has Brazilian football declined? Look at these players and you will understand.

Martinelli is 24 years old and still plays for Arsenal, having not moved to the Saudi league. Many Brazilian internationals in their prime receive not only offers from European giants but also lucrative Saudi league proposals, making financial temptation a real choice in front of them.

At age 25, many Brazilian internationals in their prime have offers from European giants, but some ultimately choose to seek wealth in the Saudi league.

This recalls his Brazilian predecessor Oscar. In January 2017, 25-year-old Oscar joined Chinese Super League club Shanghai SIPG for a transfer fee of €60 million, with an after-tax annual salary of €26 million. After five seasons in the CSL, he accumulated significant wealth through his high salary and gradually faded from the Brazilian national team picture.

If Brazil's rising stars follow Oscar's path to Saudi Arabia, their national team careers would likely face major setbacks. After all, the one thing Brazil has never lacked is star players.

This is not an isolated case. Neymar moved to Saudi Arabia at 31 while injured, and Fabinho followed at 29. The idea that 'Brazilian players look toward money' is no longer just a joke, but a reflection of changes in this football nation's talent system.

Since winning the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, Brazil have failed to win any of the five completed World Cups: they reached the quarter-finals in 2006, 2010, 2018 and 2022, and finished fourth at the 2014 home World Cup.

The loss of Brazilian football talent had already planted hidden problems more than a decade ago.

During the 2014 Brazil World Cup, media reports pointed out that Brazil had become the world's largest exporter of players. In 2013, the value of the Brazilian league was even lower than Ukraine's top division, a second-tier European league. Many Brazilian players unable to directly join European giants or top leagues used Ukraine and Russia as stepping stones, and some even went to China to seek financial opportunities.

Player exports brought Brazil nearly 3 billion US dollars in revenue over the past 20 years, becoming another important foreign-exchange industry after minerals, coffee and soybeans. But the cost was the decline of the domestic league. In 2005, 804 Brazilian players transferred abroad. At its peak in 2008, more than 1,200 players went overseas.

By 2025, Brazil still ranked first worldwide with 1,005 players abroad. But the situation has become more extreme: Brazilian players are leaving at younger ages. In the past, clubs mainly sold players for €50,000, €70,000 or €100,000, while sales in the €250,000, €300,000 and €400,000 range are becoming more common. This means Brazilian clubs are no longer only selling finished products, but also exporting semi-finished products and even raw materials.

In 2010, 31% of Brazilian U17 players were taken by European clubs before turning 17; by 2023, that figure had surged to 79%. From 2020 to 2024, 127 Brazilian prospects aged 16 to 18 were recruited by European clubs, and fewer than 7% eventually established themselves in the senior national team.

These children are taken into European tactical systems before completing development in domestic leagues, learning structured movement and tactical discipline but losing imagination and creativity.

The foundation of Brazil's domestic football is also weakening. The number of public football fields nationwide has fallen from 27,000 to 19,000. The Brazilian league association carries more than 110 billion reais in debt. In 2025, the total value of the Brazilian league continued to decline, remaining far below even a fraction of Europe's top five leagues.

Fans are also disappearing. Reports in 2014 noted that the Brazilian league averaged fewer than 20,000 spectators per match, while the once-common scenes of 50,000 or even more than 100,000 fans became memories. With top stars leaving in large numbers, domestic leagues have lost appeal and fans naturally become less willing to pay for attendance.

The foundation of Brazilian football has never been luxury youth academies, but rather the favelas and the streets.

Pele was born into a poor family, his father was a cleaner, and he grew up barefoot playing football with mangoes in the favelas. Ronaldo was still playing street football at 14. Ronaldinho's 'elastico' dribble could not be explained by any tactical board; it was an instinct refined through countless moments of improvisation on streets and alleyways.

Brazil's Ministry of Labor data shows there are about 11,000 officially registered professional players nationwide, with more than 80% earning less than 1,000 reais per month, equivalent to only about 1,300 yuan. They play football not so much because of passion, but because they have few alternatives. When a poor child has no other path upward except football, the opportunity cost of playing is almost zero.

Over the past two decades, Brazil's poverty rate has declined, the middle class has expanded, and many favelas have been replaced by apartment buildings. More Brazilian children now live in apartments, play video games and watch short videos on weekends instead of playing barefoot in the streets. Football is no longer the only way out, but one of many options.

Among Brazilian internationals born before 2000, 89% had at least five years of street football experience. Among the post-2000 generation, the figure has dropped sharply to 24%.

Brazilian clubs' youth academy evaluation has never been about 'how many internationals are developed,' but rather 'how many players can be sold and for how much.' In 2023, Brazil sent 1,217 registered players overseas, the most in the world. Over the past decade, four major Brazilian clubs earned more than €1 billion by selling academy players under 20. However, the success rate of these players in Europe has fallen from 23% to 7%.

Coaches' salaries are directly linked to shares of player transfer fees. When a 16-year-old is signed by a European giant for a high fee, a coach can receive millions in commissions. Under this incentive system, training on 'how to defend' and 'how to organize' has been greatly reduced, replaced by endless sprint drills and one-on-one dribbling exercises.

As a result, Brazil's squad structure has become seriously unbalanced. In the 26-man squad for the 2026 World Cup, the winger positions are packed with names such as Vinicius, Rodrygo, Martinelli, Antony and Raphinha, while midfield has only five players including Casemiro, Guimaraes and Paqueta. At full-back, there is not a single regular starter playing in Europe's top five leagues, and 34-year-old Danilo is still struggling to track back.

Brazilian coaches have long been absent from the mainstream stage of world football. Since Scolari, almost no Brazilian coach has managed a top team in the Premier League, La Liga, Serie A or Bundesliga. The national team brought in Italian coach Carlo Ancelotti, and he has used many veteran players in some matches; in one European qualifying match against Norway, the team's starting lineup had an average age of 29 years and 235 days, a recent high.

After the 2022 Qatar World Cup, Brazil's national team experienced repeated coaching changes: Menezes, Diniz (interim coach), and Dorival Júnior successively took charge, while Ancelotti officially took over in 2026. With multiple coaching changes in just three years, the team has repeatedly needed to rebuild tactics and personnel coordination and has never established a stable style.

No one can say clearly where the next person to carry Brazilian football forward will come from.

Vinicius recorded 16 goals and 5 assists in 36 matches for Real Madrid in the 2025-26 season and was repeatedly a key figure in the Champions League. But in major national team matches, he has often struggled against tight marking, including periods with zero shots on target and frequent loss of possession. Against Norway in a European qualifier, he struggled against targeted defending.

By contrast, Martinelli remains at Arsenal competing in the Premier League and has not chosen to move to the Middle East for financial reasons, although many Brazilian players of his generation have been unable to resist high salaries from the Saudi league.

The Neymar era has ended, but where is the next generation?

In Yokohama, Japan, in 2002, Ronaldo scored twice to defeat Germany as Brazil lifted the World Cup trophy for the fifth time. That year, Brazil's GDP was 655.45 billion US dollars. Twenty-four years later, Brazil's economy is roughly three times larger, poverty has fallen significantly, and millions of children have left the mud of the favelas. Yet Brazil have struggled to challenge for the World Cup title across multiple editions.

German economist Clement built a prediction model using five macroeconomic variables and correctly predicted the World Cup champion for three consecutive tournaments. The model implies that GDP per capita and football strength are not simply linearly related. A country needs a certain level of wealth to support youth development and infrastructure, but being 'too wealthy' can dilute the football talent base because children have more choices and football is no longer the best path.

Brazil is in a transition period where the old model is declining and the new model has not yet been built. The football soil of the favelas is disappearing, but a professional youth development system has not yet matured.

The decline of Brazilian football is the cost of the country's progress.

For Brazilian people, this may be the best news. For Samba football, however, it represents the end of an era.